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
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**American Security Policy
in the Pacific:
A New Paradigm**

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ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT

Is America's security policy in the Pacific inappropriate to security needs in the 21st century? Does this policy paradigm degrade otherwise good relations with Japan, one of America's most important Pacific allies and trading partners? In responding "yes" to both questions, this paper examines historical trends and events defining Japanese policy to gain insights into future Japanese policy. The second area focuses on the Communist threat, differing security paradigms of Pacific nations, and national security interests shared by the United States and Japan. This area concludes that nations with shared security interests can coexist and prosper despite having varying security needs. The third area builds on the first two by suggesting that NATO burdensharing formulations are inappropriate to the Pacific region and the Base Force-reconstitution-deferred production approach to force development and sustainment should be revisited. It also suggests that the United States should adopt an evolutionary security policy framework with a greater economic focus to better support America's Pacific security interests.

INTRODUCTION

Is America's security policy in the Pacific inappropriate to its security needs in the 21st century? Does this policy paradigm degrade otherwise good relations with Japan, one of America's most important Pacific allies and trading partners? And, if the answer is "yes," what is suggested? By focusing on three major areas, I will examine Japanese security policy trends and Pacific security issues and suggest the United States should reexamine its approach to security in general and in the Pacific and refocus it accordingly.

First, I will examine historical trends defining Japanese policy since 1868 as they may provide insights into future Japanese policy that may affect future American security policy. Next I will look at national objectives first enunciated by Japan in the mid 1800s. Finally, I will review lessons learned by Japan as a result of World War II--lessons still influencing Japan. Last, I will consider General Douglas MacArthur's enduring constitutional legacy.

The second major area examined focuses on the Communist threat, differing security paradigms of selected Pacific nations, and national security interests shared by the United States and Japan. Here I will highlight the notion that nations with shared security interests can coexist (and prosper) with nations having different security needs.

The third area builds on the examinations of the preceding two. Thus, the third and final argument will suggest that NATO burdensharing formulations are inappropriate to the Pacific region and should be revised. Second, it will suggest that the United States adopt an evolutionary and adaptive security policy framework that might better support American and regional security interests in the Pacific well into the 21st century.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

In developing a Pacific policy that supports American security needs into the 21st century, an appreciation of Japanese history is necessary to see if pre- and post-World War II policy trends exist, the object being to anticipate future Japanese security priorities. In this regard,

the continuities between prewar and postwar Japan are clearer [now] than they were in the immediate postwar period. . . . A strong case can be made that the 'twentieth century' began well before the turn of the century, in that certain long-term problems and trends that have affected Japan well into the twentieth century were already visible then. . . .¹

Moreover, it is likely that these problems and trends will continue to be dominant factors affecting future Japanese security policy. As a result, it is likely that they will influence American security policy.

THE MODERN SAMURAI IS BORN

The creed "rich country, strong arms" characterized Japan's military-industrial policy as power passed from the traditional samurai to the "modern" samurai.^{2, 3}

Japan's mid-nineteenth century goal of economic self-sufficiency mandated its entry into the modern Western world. But first, Japan had to choose a path between remaining tied to traditions and capitalizing on cultural strengths. Second, it had to speed its transformation from a conservative agrarian to a modern industrial society.

Japan resolved the dilemma of choosing between extremes on this tradition continuum by keeping one foot in Japan's past while putting the other foot in the West's present. In doing so, Japan first nurtured traditional cultural strengths it wished to preserve, e.g., a homogeneous culture, a strong work ethic, and allegiance to authority. Second, after the Tokugawa Shogunate

collapsed in 1868, Japan restored the Meiji emperor as the central authority.⁴ However, Japan avoided China's precedent of maintaining counterproductive traditions by adopting Western practices. This helped Japan avoid becoming a *de facto* Western colony and strengthened its independence from the West.

The Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) did not just restore the Emperor System (*Tenno-sei*). It was also significant because the emperor's absolute powers were administered by appointed officials using increasingly Westernized governmental mechanisms.⁵ Because Japan also adopted Western institutions such as a written constitution, a modern bureaucracy, a land tax to support the new central government, and an Imperial Army based on conscription, the importance of the Western character of the Restoration became even greater.⁶

However, while Restoration leaders emulated Western development, they did not adopt Western democratic ideals. Instead, their "creed was summed up in the phrase '*Fukoku kyohai*' ('rich country, strong arms')." ⁷ By the 1920s, this creed also characterized Japan's emerging military-industrial policy as power passed from traditional samurai to "modern" samurai (emerging leaders drawn from the military, civil, and political sectors).⁸

This creed's influence on Japanese security policy was evident in Japan's emulation of Western industrial development. Ironically, Japan's adoption of Western scientific and industrial techniques kept her free from Western dominance. Japan clearly understood the West's strengths were its modern industrial and military establishments. With this in mind, Japan transformed itself from "a decentralized feudal state to a modern industrial state."⁹

Some also suggest this transformation partly resulted from cultural and political conflicts between Asia and the West. Regardless, "most Japanese agreed in the 1930s that equality and independence for Asian people should be

an ingredient in whatever eventually replaced Western imperialism: hence their emphasis on [regional] 'co-existence and co-prosperity'.¹⁰

A LESSON IN MEANS

Japan's World War II experience taught it that its pursuit of self-sufficiency and independence from Western influence would be better achieved through economic vice military means.

The concepts of co-existence and co-prosperity (*Kyoson-Kyoei*) guided Japan in the 1930s and set the stage for the 1940s. These concepts, rooted in Japan's long-standing search for autonomy, pan-Asianism, and anti-Western colonialism, were published in August 1936 in a Japanese policy statement titled *The Fundamentals of National Policy*.¹¹

Japan believed it should lead Asia toward regional co-existence and co-prosperity. This belief was partly based on Japan's view that its homogeneous culture was its unique strength--especially when compared to the cultural weaknesses (diversity) in other Pacific Asian nations. But, Japan knew that its ability to exercise leadership in Asia was based on controlling regional resources--resources it neither possessed nor controlled to any great degree.

Japan's awareness that it needed control of Asian resources was a conclusion drawn from their analysis of the First World War. In fact,

of all the lessons that countries learned from the collapse of Germany in 1918, Japan's may have been the most significant for its long-term effects. War hereafter would be protracted, according to Asian observers of the European conflict, and nations had to be able to supply themselves during wartime with adequate quantities of raw materials and manufactured goods. Reliance on other countries for the materiel of war was a sure path to defeat. Through the efforts of a "total war" cadre of officers, abetted by bureaucrats intent on political change, the empire began to reorganize itself in a search for self-sufficiency.¹²

Japan's desire for self-sufficiency also had roots in the belief that "the imperialist order established by the European powers in the nineteenth century

had come to an end and that the world system would be reorganized into economically self-contained and politically autonomous supranational regional blocs."¹³ Japan believed it should control the Asian bloc.

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*Dai Toa kyoeiken*) was the vehicle by which Japan hoped to control the Asian bloc. This was a

term used by Japanese leaders beginning in 1940 to designate the projected economic and political bloc in East Asia under Japanese leadership. It would be based upon the Japanese yen and the Japanese military machine, and its ideology was embodied in the mottoes "Asia for Asiatics" and "The Eight Corners of the World under One Room," the latter taken from the Shinto classics and implying the hegemony of the Japanese Emperor.¹⁴

In reorganizing Asia under this Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan began a concerted effort to control resources in the Pacific--primarily by military means. However, Japan's vision of its role in the Pacific conflicted with the views, if not the independence, of other Pacific nations. Thus, Japan's effort to turn its vision into reality had most significant ramifications, especially for Japanese-American relations. For example, "American ideals in trade and governance . . . flatly contradicted those of Japan. From that contradiction stemmed a complicated and gradually more belligerent relationship . . . [which] would culminate in the attack on Pearl Harbor."¹⁵

Many Pacific nations also viewed Japan's economic and military drive to control resources with alarm. Thus, in addition to political and economic considerations prompting America's engagement in Pacific affairs during the early decades of the twentieth century, there was also a military motivation: to offset Japan's growing military presence in the Pacific. Perhaps in reaction to this, Japanese military leaders believed they needed to reduce animosity between the United States and Japan. As a result,

in October 1937 . . . [Japan's] Kwantung Army [in China] insisted that Japan should maintain good relations with America by proposing a bilateral agreement on the Pacific and on economic and cultural cooperation in general. Two months later, the Supreme headquarters'

army division drafted a basic guideline for the conduct of the war and stated: "Our diplomatic efforts should focus on maintaining friendly relations with the United States. We must try especially to promote economic cooperation, so necessary for carrying out our industrial and defense plans, and to improve American public opinion."¹⁶

Despite these efforts, Japan's military did not fully appreciate the significance of America's increasing involvement in the European crisis. Equally significant, neither did Japan sufficiently appreciate America's growing sensitivity "to possible connections between German aggressiveness and Japanese expansionism [being] part of a global crisis involving democratic and peace-loving countries on one hand and aggressive totalitarian states on the other."¹⁷ However, if this global crisis held America's attention on Pearl Harbor's eve, it totally dominated American policy in the decades after 1945.

The unconditional surrender terms ending World War II in the Pacific later proved Japan's preoccupation with achieving self-sufficiency and "independence" from the West primarily through its military establishment to be disastrous. One lesson was clear: Japan's World War II experience showed Japan that its pursuit of self-sufficiency and independence from Western influence would be better achieved through economic means. Thus, the first half of the twentieth century was a period in which the Japanese learned much, as events after the 1945 conclusion of World War II would indicate.

A WARRIOR'S LEGACY OF PEACE

"The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes."¹⁸

Interestingly, the decades after 1945 mirrored the decades before 1945 in that Japanese life was again transformed. This second transformation was characterized by political, military, and economic upheaval that combined into

almost indivisible influences and motivations again affecting Japanese security policy. Perhaps most notable among these was Japan's continuing quest for self-determination and freedom of action in Asia, constrained this time by a Western power, Japan's new guardian--the United States.

American constraint on Japanese sovereignty was particularly visible immediately following World War II--and largely through the efforts of General Douglas MacArthur, then the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (Pacific) and the *de facto* "Viceroy of Japan." MacArthur's influence on Japanese affairs is exemplified in his intimate involvement with the development of Japan's post-war constitution. This constitution greatly influenced the focus and direction of Japan's industrial renaissance, and, in turn, profoundly affected fifty years of post-war Japanese and American security policy in the Pacific.

After World War II, Japan's military capabilities also were constrained by the Allied-imposed constitution.¹⁹ In fact, General MacArthur provided specific textual recommendations to his staff as they prepared a draft to guide the occupied Japanese government in reforming Japan's postwar constitution in 1946.²⁰ One key provision General MacArthur directed read:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrument for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerence will ever be conferred on any Japanese force²¹

The constitution's final form was dominated by MacArthur's thoughts--the most constraining example of his influence being the so-called "peace clause:"

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never

be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.²²

While one effect of "MacArthur's constitution" was to make Japan's military institution a purely defensive force (i.e., the Self-Defense Force, or *Jiei-tai*), there were other results that also affect America's Pacific security policy.

One positive result in the early 1950s was that America could reduce its military occupation forces in Japan--which freed up American troops needed to support the United Nations' effort in Korea. However, an American military presence was still needed in Japan to provide for Japan's external defense and for collective Pacific security.²³ The need for external defense was a consequence of Article 9, which prohibits Japan from having a force projection capability. Many argue this allowed Japan to divert some of its efforts and resources from its defense sector to its commercial sector.²⁴

Nonetheless, Japan's post-World War II industrial reconstruction was still constrained by its agreement not to maintain the means of war. America's fears concerning Communism's spread and America's need for military materiel to support American forces in Korea led the Allies to relax this constraint. Thus, in 1951, Japan and America signed a defense agreement in which Japan agreed to continue providing bases in Japan for American forces.

Japan's reward for signing this agreement was economic. Once Japan was "persuaded" to produce military materiel for America's effort in Korea, Japan argued its economic recovery could only follow its effective participation in defense. This recovery could only occur by further relaxing restrictions on Japanese manufacturing that could "contribute" to Japan having the industrial means of war. "Washington, which looked to the Japanese economy to contribute to its wider plans for Asia--that is, setting up barriers against Communism by promoting economic growth--accepted this view."²⁵

In accepting this view, America resuscitated the historical relationship of complementary influence between the civil bureaucracy and the business sector--a relationship Japan considered vital to achieving its long-term goal of independence from the West. This concerned many. In fact, contemporary

critics overseas gave the political society which resulted the pejorative label, "Japan Inc.," implying both that there was an uncommonly disciplined approach to relations with the outside world, and that business considerations had an undue influence over national policy.²⁶

SUMMARY

While the influence of Japan's political-industrial relationship on modern Japanese security policy warrants continued discussion, other influences of the last 100 years contributed to the essential nature of current Japanese security policy. In this sense, Japan's long-term drive for self-sufficiency and economic hegemony has been, and will likely continue to be, key. This drive was manifest in Japan's restoration of the Emperor, its Westernized industrial development, and its desire for resource and market self-sufficiency. It was also profoundly affected and supported by General MacArthur's constitutional legacy.

ENEMIES, PARADIGMS, AND FRIENDS

In developing a regional security policy, the current security environment must be examined for two reasons. First, understanding current collective security relationships underpins any successful effort to help shape future ones. Second, the understanding gained is a prerequisite to being able to counter, reduce, or eliminate future threats. Thus, the focus here is on the Communist threat, differing security perspectives of Pacific nations other than the United States and Japan, and national security interests shared by the United States and Japan.

FAREWELL TO (COMMUNIST) ARMS

It is clearly not 1950; the Cold War is over.

From the late 1800s to the mid 1900s, American interest in the Pacific had several bases, the most basic being geographic. It also resulted from its quest for economic markets and resources. A third motivation was an egalitarian desire to promulgate democratic values. Finally, America was in the Pacific to constrain Japanese military hegemony. However, only since the end of the Second World War has that last purpose been supplanted by the United States' efforts to contain, if not reverse, the spread of Communism.

America's battle against its primary enemy of the last half century, Communism, began in earnest after World War II. By 1950, two wartime allies of the United States--China and the Soviet Union--were America's ideological and military enemies. Since then, American security policy has been largely focused on offsetting these two nations' influence and on "containing" Communism throughout the world. Postwar Japan also viewed Communism as a military threat. In fact, "the threat of Communism in the 1950s is what led

to the formation of the Self-Defense Forces, and the threat of Soviet forces sustained the growth of Japan's military forces in the 1970s."²⁷

This effort to contain Communism colored American security policy in the Pacific. By 1949, the United States had officially conceived the "Domino Theory," warning the world that if Indochina fell to Communist forces, other countries of Southeast Asia would too. The containment concept was expanded so that shortly after North Korean forces entered South Korean territory and the Soviet Union and China recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, President Truman applied the containment of Communism policy to Asia.

One purpose of America's containment policy in the Pacific, then, was to prevent Chinese expansion into Southeast and possibly all of Asia. Events would later prove this fear to be largely unfounded. America's Vietnam experience is illustrative. America's attempt to "contain" China by checking North Vietnam was motivated by the Domino Theory and the naive assumption that the region would fall to the Communists if North Vietnamese forces won the Vietnamese civil war. Unfortunately, this view disregarded the complex nationalistic diversity of Southeast Asia. Thus, when South Vietnam fell to North Vietnam, other nations did not progressively fall under Communist domination in the Pacific--or elsewhere. The reverse occurred, e.g., in Europe, the "Revolutions of 1989" led to the Warsaw Pact's collapse. By December 1991, the Soviet Union--and the military threat it posed--ceased to exist.

However, while Communism (the Soviets) ceased being a threat to the United States, either across the Atlantic or in the Pacific, there are nominal military threats to Pacific security--most notably North Korea. North Korea has a significant military capability poised at the border dividing Communist North Korea from democratic South Korea. In fact, North Korea "spends more money per capita on military expenditures than any other country in the world

except Israel. North Korea has the third largest army in the Communist world, exceeded only by China and the [former] Soviet Union."²⁸ According to American intelligence estimates, North Korea's armed forces are comprised of 1.1 million people, with 3,000 tanks and 800 combat aircraft.²⁹ North Korea is also very close to having developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.

However, while North Korean military capabilities today are formidable, it is clearly not 1950: the Cold War is over. Even fully discounting the deterrent capability of the highly trained and well-equipped American and South Korean forces in South Korea, "it seems increasingly unlikely that the North Koreans could count on Chinese or Soviet [i.e., Russian] support for an invasion of the South."³⁰ North Korea understands this--particularly in light of the Iraqi experience during Desert Storm and Desert Shield. In short, North Korea poses no threat to the vital interests of the United States.

This, and North Korea's apparent recognition that like Iraq, it cannot go it alone, perhaps prompts it to take a new approach--the discussions between North and South Korea being representative. These discussions prompted America to contribute to Korean rapprochement. Two examples include the United States' cancellation of the annual American-South Korean military exercise called "Team Spirit" in 1992 and American offers to denuclearize American forces in Korea if substantial progress is made on North Korean nuclear control.³¹ Such American offers would not have been possible before the demise of the Soviet Union, the rise of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Desert Storm and Desert Shield.

American support of Korean rapprochement also serves one of America's vital interests, i.e., a stable and secure world. This support complements a desire to establish a regional balance of power which the United States can lever in one direction or another, depending upon events and need, e.g., to

address the impact a reunified Korea might have on the future of Japanese military expenditures and the regional balance, or address the impact rising Japanese military strength might have on China, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia.³²

SECURITY IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

"Military and economic power must be seen more as parts of a [security] continuum, and should no longer be examined under separate microscopes."³³

Security threats are typically filtered through a nation's traditional paradigm and are often overwhelmingly focused on military factors. Such a narrow focus may result in a nation having an incomplete view of the security environment. Moreover, such an approach ignores or minimizes the interplay between political, economic, and military instruments of national power.

A different approach is offered--threats to Pacific security will be briefly addressed from three perspectives: American, Japanese, and regional. Collectively, these views of Pacific security may provide a more complete view of future threats to Pacific stability. They also may provide insights into factors influencing the behavior of Pacific nations.

Not surprisingly, the American military planners and strategists have historically viewed threats to American security in a largely military context. Unfortunately, a consequence of this focus is an underappreciation of political and economic threats to security or a failure to see America's concerns strategically. This preoccupation with military threats is also a byproduct of the American political system itself, and of the resulting difficulty in gaining a consensus on how to define political threats or quantify economic threats to American security. Further complicating this circumstance is a

dilemma: even as such threats are increasingly defined or quantified, it is correspondingly more difficult to achieve a consensus on how to best offset or negate such threats among industrial, military, and government leaders.

Despite this, economic factors are becoming more prominent in security considerations. There are even indications that the United States may see it

can no longer downgrade the economic component of statecraft and focus almost exclusively upon military force as the most capable means of influencing other national behaviors. . . . Military and economic power must be seen more as parts of a [security] continuum, and should no longer be examined under separate microscopes. . . . [However,] no truly important state could be effectively coerced solely by economic means; the threat or use of military force would still be essential.³⁴

As a result, while maintaining the need for a base capability, America is beginning to acknowledge that "economic security is as important as military security to maintain economic prosperity and political stability, [and that] domestic and international political efforts are a vital part of the strategy and may become more, rather than less, important in the years to come."³⁵

While this emerging view is new to Americans, this view conforms to the perspective essentially held by Japan since the 1868 Meiji Restoration. Japan has long viewed threats to its security from a broader perspective, i.e., from military and non-military sources. This is known as "comprehensive security." In this sense, Japan differs from America in that Americans tend to base their evaluation overwhelmingly on their opponent's capability, while Japanese tend to consider their opponent's capability and will.³⁶ However, the fundamental difference is this: Japan views regional threats in terms of political instability and economic malaise, not military forces. Thus,, Japan's policies are intended to add to political stability and long-term economic development.

Japan's long-standing view that security is fundamentally based on economic concerns is not surprising given Japan's circumstances. Among

industrialized nations, Japan is one of the least endowed with indigenous resources and one of the most dependent on external supplies. As a result, Japan tends to worry about economic security to an even greater extent than some of its allies--including the United States. A few facts illustrate why this is so. In the area of energy, Japan imports 99.8 percent of its oil. As to soyabeans, Japan's primary vegetable protein source, Japan is only five percent self-sufficient, being almost totally dependent on American imports.³⁷ Other statistics make Japan's vulnerability more clear.

AMERICAN-JAPANESE IMPORTS³⁸

<u>CATEGORY OF DEPENDENCE</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>
OIL AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENERGY	70.0	46.0
MIDDLE EAST OIL AS PERCENTAGE OF ENERGY	74.0	35.0
IMPORTS AS A PERCENT OF ENERGY	87.0	20.6

If Americans largely view threats in a military context and the Japanese largely view security in an economic sense, how do other Pacific nations view security? In some respects the security perspective of the Pacific nations is better balanced than those of the United States or Japan. This more balanced view of the threat environment was evidenced in a 1979 declaration of the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These foreign ministers declared that their long-range objective was to keep the Southeast Asian region free of outside influence and great power rivalries. Interestingly, it created an arena for "benign" political-military confrontations between great powers (American-Soviet), thereby equalizing these two great powers in the Pacific. The intent of this declaration was also to minimize the likelihood of hegemony by Pacific nations with a record of military aggression (Japan) or dominance by Pacific nations with colonial or quasi-colonial pasts (the United States in the latter case). Third, by

promoting economic interdependence, it discouraged Japan from increasing its emphasis on its military instrument of national power.

In this respect, close economic ties with Japan have the beneficial effect of retarding increased Japanese involvement in regional security. Recalling Japan's military occupation of Pacific and Asian nations, Japan's economic orientation pleases many Pacific nations as they do not want to add military dependence on Japan to their existing economic dependence--especially if that means reducing the American military presence. Singapore's Minister for Information and Arts, Brigadier General George Yeo, expressed a common Pacific view to the Asian Wall Street Journal's Capital Markets Conference:

It is frightening to conceive of an Asia without the U.S. military presence for the next 20 years." Yeo said if the U.S. were to withdraw from Asia, "Japan will be forced to rearm, and China as well as Korea will oppose Japan." Yeo said this would cause regional destabilization.³⁹

COMMON INTERESTS DIVIDING UNCOMMON ALLIES

"U.S.-Japanese relations are increasingly viewed as approaching a crossroads, with the potential for both increased amicability as well as increased hostility."⁴⁰

In addressing common security interests, it is instructive to first recall America's four vital interests because they are fundamental interests shared with Japan: Survival as a free and independent nation, a healthy and competitive domestic economy, cooperative relations with allies and friendly nations, and a stable and secure world.⁴¹ With these national objectives serving as a core of shared security interests, it is not surprising that the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by Senator Sam Nunn, considers Japan "one of the most important allies of the United States, and the most important ally in Asia."⁴² In making this assessment, the Pacific Study

Group of the Senate Armed Services Committee said this was based in part upon the interdependence of the American and Japanese economies, Japan's economic strength and potential, and Japan's geostrategic location.⁴³

Despite sharing vital interests that should serve as fundamental and inviolable bonds between two allied nations, American-Japanese relations are increasingly viewed as approaching a crossroads. The primary tensions between Tokyo and Washington lie not in the military arena, but rather in their economic relationship."⁴⁴ This has long-standing security implications for the United States and Japan, as well as for the Pacific region.

In 1979, the *Report of the Pacific Study Group to the Committee on Armed Services* of the United States Senate stated "Japan clearly has the economic potential to assume a substantially greater portion of her defense burden."⁴⁵ More recently, others have expressed the belief that "Japanese defense expenditures, totalling about 1 percent of GNP [Gross National Product], were thought to be inexcusably small in relation to the size of Japan's economy. Many argued that Japan's prosperity and competitiveness are due in large part to the protection provided by the U.S. military."⁴⁶ They further argued that instead of Japan spending money on its domestic and regional defense, it modernized and expanded its own domestic industrial capacity.

This led the United States House of Representatives to protest what they viewed as too low a level of Japanese defense spending. As a counterpoint, the House cited the facts that America spent over six percent of its GNP on defense, and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) prime, NATO allies spent as much as two to five percent of their respective GNPs on defense. In 1987, the House passed a non-binding resolution "insisting" that Japan increase its defense spending from one to three percent of its GNP.⁴⁷

Once the rhetoric began to fade, however, the practical implications of this request became clear. Three percent of Japan's 1987 GNP equaled approximately \$90 billion, the equivalent of ten carrier battle groups. "Most agreed Japan could not dispose of such a large sum without seriously upsetting both the regional military balance and the domestic political situation."⁴⁹

However, if balanced defense burdensharing between America and Japan is but one (albeit a key) divisive issue between these two allies, what else is it, then, that inhibits harmony in their security relationship? The answer is probably economic vitality (security), i.e., the shared, but divisive, vital interest in a healthy and competitive domestic economy. However, defense burdensharing and economic security issues are linked. Interestingly, as the rate of economic growth, productivity, capital investment, and savings declined in America, the issue of defense burdensharing increasingly came to the fore. It was as though if Japan gained ground, America somehow lost ground. However, an alternative view may more accurately reflect the situation.

The rise of Japan as a world [economic] power does not necessarily foreshadow the [economic] decline of the United States. It is clear that their respective positions are changing but it is not a zero-sum game. The kind of unilateral postwar dominance that the United States enjoyed in terms of economic, political, and military power has long been changing. Indeed, U.S. efforts to promote the economic revival of Western Europe and Japan was a major factor in bringing this about. It did so in the belief that economic development would lead to international security. The peace and prosperity that we enjoy today is a testimony to this idea.⁴⁹

In fact, perhaps America's premier security issue really has to do with the way the United States pursues a healthy economy in the domestic and international arenas. Thus, it does not follow logically, as some would suggest, that allied nations who are economic competitors of the United States must be, by definition, political opponents of the United States or considered unsupportive of American security interests. Nor does it follow that friendly

or allied nations having security concerns and priorities different from those of the United States should be perceived as unreliable or deficient in their collective security effort.

"A[nother] major problem of perception in U.S.-Japan relations is the tendency of many Americans to equate individual [corporate] action with national policies, to assume that when something unpleasant takes place there is an unspoken conspiracy between government and perpetrator."⁵⁰ This misperception--found in America and Japan--emotionally charges what should be rational deliberations on serious issues. It also veils the shared interests of the two nations. This perception is not easily overcome.

SUMMARY

The United States and Japan share vital national security interests--a fact of singular importance that is often taken for granted. Not surprisingly, such shared interests do not prevent bilateral problems. While there are formidable bilateral security issues to resolve (e.g., defense burdensharing), divisiveness resulting from each nation's pursuit of economic vitality^{*} potentially has greater security implications for each nation and for the Pacific region. From the American perspective, the greatest hope for progress in reducing divisiveness lies in the way the United States addresses its economic needs. In fact, "this may require some adjustments for both the United States and Japan in the years ahead, but as long as both countries realize the larger benefits of their relationship, the end result will surely be worth the wait."⁵¹

TOWARD EVOLUTIONARY SECURITY

The world is rife with change. The Soviet Union is dead and its remains pose no credible threat to global security for the near- to mid-term. In the absence of a Russian threat, America has a unique opportunity to reorient its Pacific security strategy in light of new global and domestic circumstances and in support of its long-term vital interests. Foremost among these interests is the protection of the United States and its citizens. A second vital interest is a stable and secure regional balance network. The third interest is freedom of the seas, unconstrained flow of trade and commerce, and free access to markets and resources. Last is the support of democratic institutions and human rights.⁵² These interests will continue to undergird America's Pacific security policy--even as that policy evolves in response to still changing national, regional, and global circumstances. In brief, the global revolution makes evolutionary changes in defense burdensharing and security relationships in the Pacific possible and necessary.

THE EVOLUTION OF REVOLUTION

"A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration--and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed--to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us,"⁵³

Revolution begets evolution. The revolutionary events transforming the former Soviet Union suggest the necessity of making evolutionary changes transforming the American attitude toward defense. The United States must take cognizance of new strategic relationships. These changes do not come easily. The attitudinal yoke that came with America's addiction to the enemy it loved to hate is no longer appropriate and must be cast off. Such change

is not destabilizing. Rather, it is, as President Bush suggested in the quotation above, an extraordinary opportunity to build a new, regional security system that better protects American ideals, values, and interests.

There are, however, at least two dangers in reorienting America's national security. One is the desire of some for America to withdraw within its borders. Given the interdependent international environment, isolationism is an anachronistic response to profound changes in the political, military, and economic sectors. Another danger is the desire to maintain the *status quo*, though most would concede that too much has changed politically to make that an even remotely viable approach. Thus, the prudent response to radical change is probably not to take an approach found at either extreme of the security continuum. Rather, it is to take a more moderating approach that focuses on change and supports long-held American ideals, values, and interests. The question is: How best to respond?

Some suggest America should adopt a two-pronged approach. First, its armed forces should emulate the Reichswehr model--a small core structure that spawns a larger, reconstituted military structure should the need arise. The premise is that on a daily basis, a less expensive but sufficient "Base Force" is maintained to respond to regional scenarios--individually or in limited combinations--thereby keeping America at a point on the conflict continuum less than nuclear or global conventional war. However, this approach is dependent on three enormous assumptions. One is that the necessary funding, infrastructure investments, industrial base, and materiel needed to create, equip, and sustain a reconstituted force would exist when needed. Another is that America would have the time needed to build up such a force. A third assumption is that America would enjoy United Nations and allied support.

The second prong, prototyping, has the United States conducting then shelving research and development, while limiting acquisition and production. While offering some economic benefits, this approach has at least two key weaknesses. One is that such an approach inappropriately discounts the often significant benefits that only the production, fielding, and use of new military hardware in daily operations offers. Second, it possibly inhibits America from taking best advantage of its technological prowess--extant and latent--because producing and fielding new major weapon systems in sufficient numbers increasingly takes years, if not decades, to accomplish. Fielding could come late to need--a calculated risk, admittedly, but perhaps also a fatal flaw. History should be a guide: state of the art tanks, whose technology was shelved between the two world wars, obviously could not be used by American forces against the German Afrika Korps in 1942--much to the disadvantage of those Allied forces so engaged.

THE BURDEN OF BURDENSARING

"No effective solution to the burdensharing issue has yet been presented,"

Defense burdensharing among allies offers many benefits, e.g., local national employment, economies from using a host nation's logistics infrastructure, unity of effort, and reduced outlays for collective security. If vital security interests are served, such results are desirable--especially in a fiscally-constrained environment. However, burdensharing exacts a price due to its quantitative deficiencies. It is also costly in that it can foster higher and often unrealized expectations on the part of contributing nations. Because this affects the Japanese-American security relationship and regional security in the Pacific, burdensharing should be critically examined.

Burdensharing's quantitative disadvantage involves the difficulties associated with defining, measuring, and apportioning defense burdens in ways acceptable to diverse nations. This contravenes the popular belief that burdensharing can be precisely measured, or even appropriately depicted by comparing a nation's defense budget with its gross domestic or national products. To the contrary, analysis of such data suggests that defense burdens should not be so narrowly defined.⁵⁴ The chart below is illustrative.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (FY 1988)⁵⁵

<u>RANK</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>EXPENDITURE (\$M, 1985 PRICES)</u>	<u>RATIO TO GNP/ GDP (% in 1987)</u>
--	USSR (former)	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed
--	United States	260,268	6.4
3	United Kingdom	22,637	4.7
4	France	21,903	4.0
5	Germany	20,870	3.0
6	Japan	15,298	1.0
7	Saudi Arabia	14,444	22.7
8	Italy	11,178	2.4
9	India	8,247	3.8
10	Canada	7,985	2.1

Though the data above suggests that France bears a greater defense burden than Japan or Germany, such a conclusion ignores the intangible burden these latter two nations bear, for example, in having foreign armed forces stationed on their territory--to include former Soviet forces in Germany's case.

In addressing these less emphasized defense burdens, Japan's defense white paper, *Defense of Japan: 1990*, discusses noise pollution and refers somewhat indirectly to opportunity costs resulting from using Japanese land for American bases in one of the most densely populated nations in the world. Also discussed are political and psychological burdens associated with having foreign forces in Japan--a point made in similar German white papers.⁵⁷

Nations whose defense burden is thus underportrayed often feel their contribution to regional security is underappreciated. Thus, they frequently use other (equally deficient) methods to show their support of the defense burden is "equitable," e.g., defense expenditures. However, using such data can lead to equally misleading conclusions given the nature of the burdensharing data typically used, as the chart below suggests.

JAPANESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES⁵⁹
(UNIT: ¥100 million, %)

<u>FISCAL YEAR (FY)</u>	<u>GNP (INITIAL FORECAST)</u>	<u>DEFENSE BUDGET (ORIGINAL)</u>	<u>RATIO OF DEF BUDGET TO GNP</u>
1955	75,590	1,340	1.78
1965	281,600	3,014	1.07
1975	1,585,000	13,273	0.84
1985	3,146,000	31,371	0.99
1990	4,172,000	41,593	0.99

This data suggests Japan's defense expenditures as a percentage of its GNP are roughly constant over the long term. However, these figures ignore substantial and increasing Japanese foreign aid and grants to Pacific nations, contributions that promote stability, economic progress, and security.⁵⁹ There is also a need to adjust for conscription, which lowers nominal costs. Economic arguments, which further cloud matters, include the "produce here" orientation which suggests that if defense articles are not produced by the country using them, opportunity costs and foreign dependency result.

Burdensharing's second disadvantage is that greater contributions do not necessarily result in proportionate, or even any, increase in security or influence. Thus, the "assumption that a modest expansion of Japanese military capabilities would necessarily increase Japan's security and reduce dependency on the United States" is not demonstrable.⁶⁰ Moreover, as nations increase

their support of collective security, they expect a similar increase in their ability to influence collective security policy. This often does not occur.

Nonetheless, as America's allies gained economic strength, the United States increasingly expected them to share a greater portion of collective security costs--costs heretofore significantly borne by the United States. This approach to "burdensharing" enjoyed some success in NATO. However, its use in the Pacific, where a comparable NATO structure does not exist, presents some difficulties--especially with respect to Japan. For example, no NATO nation is as constrained as Japan in terms of being constitutionally prohibited from projecting its self-defense forces beyond its home islands in support of a regional security effort. The profound nature of this limitation was evident in Japanese Diet debates (and fistcuffs) in 1991 concerning whether or not Japan could contribute to United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Despite its limitations, however, burdensharing data can be a useful general guide (vice a benchmark) in developing an equitable and comprehensive defense burdensharing system that sufficiently addresses mutually perceived threats. However, at least four drawbacks could result from not improving upon such data's comprehensiveness. First, it may contribute to the fallacy that increased defense budgets axiomatically result in increased collective security. Second, it can result in inequitable security agreements and avoidable tension among allies due to underportrayed contributions. Third, it continues the focus on monetary inputs to the security process at the expense of more important outputs such as military capabilities, thus penalizing efficiency. Fourth, it often fails to note that nations "can contribute to security by not doing certain things. [For example,] Japan promotes stability in East Asia by not rearming more rapidly. If Japan were to acquire a

military role in the region, this would not only enflame anti-Japanese feelings; the resulting turmoil would jeopardize U.S. interests as well."⁶¹

THE POWER OF FOCUSED SECURITY

"The United States has a finite amount of power with global commitments,"⁶²

Since 1945, America has been the "world's policeman," and so has guaranteed bilateral, regional, and global security. For many reasons, it may no longer play this role. However, its vital interests make it imperative that it remains engaged in global and regional security affairs. Therefore, the issue to be considered is not to be or not to be engaged. Rather, it is to determine to what degree can and should America be engaged, and to determine how should America focus its security efforts in the Pacific.

The *de facto* demise of the Soviet (Russian) threat in the Pacific, a declining American defense budget, and resurgent Congressional emphasis on domestic issues should encourage the United States to direct its efforts toward crafting a new collective security policy for the Pacific. The keystone of this more focused approach to Pacific security, then, could be a security partnership of the military and economic capabilities of America and Japan, respectively, linked by political arrangements. Key to this new approach is Japan's involvement in regional security:

Given the economic strength of Japan, and the budget and deficit problems of the United States, Japan's major contribution to the security relationship should be the maintenance of a strong but not destabilizing self-defense force and economic support for U.S. forward deployed forces. With this shared approach to roles and missions within the security relationship, the United States and Japan can support their mutual interests as well as the broader interests of all nations for regional security and balance in Asia.⁶³

However, for many reasons, America must significantly restructure and reduce its budget in defense and other areas. Despite on-going and planned reductions to its defense structure, it will remain the world's premier military power for the mid-term. Key to that ranking is the United States' unequalled force projection capability. Conversely, Japan's armed forces are constitutionally restricted to self-defense and virtually no force projection capability. Thus, it makes sense to capitalize on America's military capabilities--which will be great even after reduction and restructuring.

On the other hand, while Japan's economic rate of growth is slowing recently, it clearly has the capability to provide more financial support to regional economic development initiatives that can enhance Pacific stability and security. Thus, while it is probably prudent for Japan to continue modernizing its role-limited Self-Defense Forces, it seems more useful for Japan to forgo significant defense spending increases in lieu of contributing to Pacific security through economic assistance, some kinds of military aid, and closer political contact.⁶⁴ In fact, Japan "undertaking a military role larger than one of self-defense may well seem to divisive internally and too provocative externally to be worth the hypothetical advantages."⁶⁵

As focused security applies to Japan, some argue that "increased burdensharing by Japan . . . ought to be irrelevant to the viability of the U.S. commitment [to Japan]. The central reason for defending Japan is the country's unquestioned importance to the United States in strategic and economic terms."⁶⁶ However, America must realize that it may be neither militarily prudent, nor politically or economically affordable, to be the sole guarantor of Pacific security. Pacific security may be best satisfied via Japanese and American economic assistance and development, complemented by an American military presence. This approach is not destabilizing. In fact,

the role of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship will not change measurably but will provide three major elements of security: a nuclear deterrent for Japan in the absence of worldwide nuclear disarmament; deterrence and stability in Northeast Asia through the self-defense capability of Japan and the presence of U.S. forces with a power projection capability; and U.S. forward deployed forces in the region to ensure freedom of the seas, access to resources and markets, and regional stability and balance.⁶⁷

This reoriented approach, when combined with Korean peninsula instabilities and the lack of a credible threat to Japan's homeland, also suggests changes are needed in the disposition of selected American forces in the Pacific based on regional security--not, primarily, on Japan's or South Korea's defense. Nonetheless, it remains politically and militarily prudent for America's Seventh Fleet to remain based in Japan. Relocating the fleet and replicating its port infrastructure would be unaffordable for America and Japan--both of whom now share in the cost to base the fleet in Japan.

Given that Japan's Constitution may prohibit Japan from letting America actually use Japan's islands as a force projection base during contingencies during situations in which Japan's vital interests are not directly threatened, it may be prudent to move combat service support assets from Japan. First, it avoids a possibly inevitable constitutional crisis in Japan that could be disadvantageous to Japanese-American relations. Second, it makes Japan solely responsible for the defense of its islands, which would permit the transfer of American fighter squadrons from Japan to Alaska. There they could contribute to American security in the Northern Pacific area. Alternatively, they could be deactivated as part of America's defense drawdown.

SUMMARY

Burdensharing, though flawed, is likely to remain a key factor in America's security relationships in the Pacific--especially in Japan's case.

Since burdensharing has divisive and cohesive effects, and since burdensharing inequities increase the likelihood of its divisive effects being significant, the comprehensiveness of burdensharing data must be improved. This would facilitate a refocused Japanese-American partnership supporting Pacific security and stability, and contributing to their individual and shared security postures. In turn, this would permit a somewhat restructured American military presence in the Pacific that preserves regional stability by complementing economically-based security initiatives and by offsetting potential or actual military hegemony from any source in the region. Such a reoriented approach to security can only come after a reexamination of the "new" United States "Reichswehr-shelved technology approach" to creating and sustaining an appropriately smaller but expandable United States national military capability, an approach history suggests is at least partially flawed.

EPILOGUE

America's security policy in the Pacific is inappropriate to American security needs in the 21st century and damaging to improved American-Japanese relations. If America is to best influence international events, it must develop a new Pacific security policy. Political, military, and economic considerations, long held as independent elements of national power, should now be seen as three dependent components of national security. It must also do three things. First, it must better acknowledge the historic influences that affect Japan and other Pacific nations. Second, it must improve existing burdensharing relationships so best meet regional security needs so they unify rather than divide. Third, it must recognize the growing role economics has in contemporary security policy.

When dealing with Japan, America's preeminent Pacific ally, America should particularize its focus by better acknowledging the consistent influences that have shaped Japanese security policy for 100 years. America should acknowledge that Japan's quest for economic vitality (security)--a legitimate national interest--will continue as a key factor influencing Japanese security policy. This is followed closely in importance by Japan's unwavering adherence to its American-inspired and -imposed constitution, as complemented by a desire not to alarm its Pacific neighbors with an inappropriate defense build-up given recent events and Japan's history.

Moreover, in crafting a new American security policy for the Pacific, it is presumptuous and inappropriate to suggest (as some have) that Japan should amend its constitution to permit the development of a Japanese force projection capability, or to permit a Japanese military build up that is neither needed for Japan's self-defense nor for Pacific stability. It may be

more constructive to update defense burdensharing formulations by relying less on anachronistic "measures of merit" that focus on raw inputs, e.g., defense budgets as a percentage of gross domestic or national products. It may be more useful to focus on specific outputs, i.e., *capabilities* enhancing collective security in the political, economic, and military arenas.

In refocusing America's Pacific security paradigm, it also might be more useful for military planners to increasingly view economics as largely representing the substance of shared national security interests--interests which are generally promoted by political means, and ultimately protected by military capabilities. This must be preceded by a sound economic underpinning to any security policy. This is a renewed, rather than a new, approach. According to Colonel James Toth, USMC (Retired), presently a Department of Strategy faculty member at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the original containment concept was to rebuild economically around the world through such vehicles as the Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods Conference, and force the Soviet Union to deteriorate economically in the center. This "new" paradigm could also be used to revise the way the United States perceives and constructs its defense burdensharing relationships with Japan and other allies. In short, just as there is no monolithic threat to the vital security of the United States, there should be no monolithic American approach to security arrangements in the various regions of the world.

The comments above suggest, rightly, that consideration of Japanese interests loom large in any American security policy applicable to the Pacific region. However, America's ability to craft such a security policy, though affected by what the Japanese do or do not do, may not rest in Japanese hands to the extent often believed. Rather, it may rest more with the United States' willingness to comprehensively address domestic and international economic

issues in a bipartisan way to the extent that the United States does not begrudge other nations their economic successes. This has great impact on America's Pacific security policy. For example, it may be this situation that largely prompts American dissatisfaction with the current American-Japanese burdensharing relationship. It may also be this situation that prompts some to suggest Pacific security policies of an isolationist tone or policies of economic protectionism. In short, it may be more emotionally palatable for America to find the "enemy" without than to correct the problem within.

Broadly speaking, then, if the United States is to regain control of its Pacific security policy, establish a new Pacific security paradigm, and improve upon its security relationship with Japan, it must avoid such emotionalism while simultaneously meeting five prerequisites:

- While addressing voter and interest group concerns, the United States government must avoid making policy statements that promote acrimonious debate and imply that the United States takes for granted the fact that it shares vital interests with Japan.
- American security policy must better acknowledge that "historic" influences will likely affect Japan's political, economic, and military activities, and its relationship with the United States. The challenge is to better understand the dynamics of regional balances and national interests, and be prepared to act on that understanding. Regional balance is the strategic objective.
- The United States must revise its security policy paradigm by giving more emphasis to the impact domestic and international economic considerations have on regional security issues.
- Senior representatives of the Executive and Legislative Branches of government must jointly develop a long-term, strategic view of Pacific security policy using a permanent, bi-partisan mechanism. Though admittedly ambitious and somewhat idealistic, this could help extend the United States' strategic horizon beyond the two years dictated by the Congressional election and budget cycles.
- The United States must encourage Japan to join a dialogue defining the nature of their roles in promoting and providing collective security in the Pacific region in the twenty-first century.

In closing, the New World Order of which President Bush spoke can become a reality. Certainly, more recent international developments contribute greatly to the probability of its realization. However, it is America's domestic efforts that may contribute more--particularly in the areas of refocusing its security policy, reexamining its approach to creating and sustaining its armed forces, better integrating its economic policy, and improving its long-term industrial performance.

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